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ABSTRACT

KEYWORDS

Hyperconnected societies offer new opportunities for the role of the
individual voice. A deregulated world of information poses a paradox,
however, in which fake news might conceivably underpin the poli
tical agenda more than informed research. The sheer amount of
information available forces publics and audience members to seek
shortcuts to knowledge through access to preferred academic, public
intellectual or ‘thought leader’ perspectives. Drawing upon theories
of deliberative democracy and open communication, this paper
critiques the roles of academic, public intellectual and thought leader
to move beyond discussion of the value of individual voices in the
sharing of knowledge. It suggests that both public intellectuals and
thought leaders illuminate how the individual voice makes an impor
tant contribution in providing continuity when open communication
of research is disrupted by unruly speakers and publics.

Public intellectual;
knowledge champion;
thought leader; Greta
Thunberg; deliberative
democracy

Introduction
In responding to the idea of ‘Future-proofing communication at the academy-societal
interface’, this paper responds to a significant challenge. Academics in a deregulated
world of information cannot help but acknowledge that fake news might conceivably
underpin more of the political agenda than informed research (Lazer et al., 2018). ‘Share
of knowledge’ is not reflected in ‘share of voice’ and even less connected to ‘share of power’.
The work of the public intellectual in synthesising and popularising the findings of
rigorous research has never been more important (Dahlgren, 2012). In an informationsaturated world, publics and audience members seek shortcuts to knowledge. An estab
lished personal brand becomes part of a speaker’s credibility (for example, Mary Beard,
or Brian Cox), while imprimaturs of quality and effectiveness (Nobel prizes, Uber,
Extinction Rebellion) indicate to wider publics the thinkers, the changes, and the move
ments to which they should be paying attention (Brint, 2020; Elshtain, 2014).
The challenge for informed voices seeking to cut through the clamour may appear
overwhelming. Being an internet sensation requires a different skillset from rigorous
investigation and analysis (Abidin, 2018; Livingstone & Helsper, 2010). Paradoxically,
digital cut-through may also reflect support from legacy media (as with Beard and Cox).
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Yet the social interface of education continues to be crucial, and longstanding commu
nication research around societal interfaces, from the 2-step flow of information and
opinion leadership (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955) through to networked knowledge-sharing
and social capital (Lefebvre, Sorenson, Henchion, & Gellynck, 2016), help explain the role
of new knowledge champions. Chief among these, in 2019–20, is Greta Thunberg (Kühne,
2019). Her repeated call to ‘listen to scientists’ (Milman & Smith, 2019) indicates that even
as the public sphere becomes more amorphous and diffuse, a clear message spoken
authoritatively can galvanise the future and rehabilitate the academy (Thunberg, 2019).
This paper responds to a provocation that suggests the academy will become precar
ious as a result of open science empowering individual citizens and democratising
knowledge. That provocation intimates that, while the academy may still have relevance
as an organisation that creates, curates and communicates knowledge, the public may not
recognise that relevance and may choose not to connect with the expertise it implies. This
paper contributes to the debate by highlighting threads of continuity evident in aspects of
the hyperconnected global communication environment while also acknowledging that
dynamic change operates as a driving force for disruption. The argument advanced is
that futureproofing the links between academy and society rests in a continuing commit
ment to robust, persuasive research that has the capacity to inspire and influence key
social actors. The important contributions made by public intellectuals and thought
leaders illuminate the value of the individual voice in providing continuity when unruly
speakers and publics disrupt the open communication of research.

Deliberative democracies and ‘information shortcuts’
The paper starts with the position that the individual voice is important, and nowhere
more so than for those people whose good fortune it is to live in the deliberative
democracies that characterise the world’s free market economies. In fact, the aspiratory
ideals underpinning Western liberal democracies cannot be completely achieved but
offer standards to strive for and empirical suggestions for how political processes might
work better (Bächtiger, Dryzek, Mansbridge, & Warren, 2018).
Deliberative democracies are jointly constituted both by democracy and by deliberation.
Indeed the democratic process, in the words of Kim, Wyatt and Katz, occurs when ‘citizens
voluntarily and freely participate in discussions on public issues, [and is] a discursive
system where citizens share information about public affairs, talk politics, form opinions
and participate in political processes’ (1999, p. 361). An effective, working, deliberative
democracy demands, and always has demanded, access to relevant quality information and
a citizenry capable of discerning both the relevance and the quality of the information they
encounter.
The exchanges about public affairs that take place between ordinary people are vitally
important for a ‘talk-centric democracy’ (Chambers, 2003). Major studies highlight the role
of individual voices and personal influence in mini-publics (Huckfeldt, Johnson, &
Sprague, 2004). They are accorded the function of connecting the private realm of people’s
everyday lifeworlds with the public sphere and ultimately the institutions of governance
and the processes of decision-making which take place within these (Chambers, 2012;
Habermas, 1996). On the one hand, informal conversations provide opportunities for
informal information from everyday discussions to contribute to formal public discussions
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by empowering citizens’ participation in political debate. On the other hand, informal
political chats within social networks motivate participation in the affairs of the day, and
improve skills for public discussion (Schmitt-Beck & Grill, 2020).
The promise of the diversity and inclusion of deliberative democracy is a strong fit for
the hyperconnected complexity of the contemporary world (Chambers & Gastil, 2020).
Boulianne (2009, 2016) suggests that the digital environment offers a more deliberative
democracy and potentially shapes change in political engagement and participation.
Chen (2020) believes that a deliberative process can foster ordinary citizens’ thoughtful
discussions on well-being issues. It can also increase civic participation in community
development (Boulianne, Chen, & Kahane, 2020).
In political systems, some citizens are relatively more influential within the networks of
communication connecting individuals to one another. ‘Public intellectuals’ and thought
leaders are such persons of influence in opinion formation. The established notion of public
intellectual is reflected in Russell Jacoby’s 1987 definition of the term. He deemed it to mean
‘writers and thinkers who address a general and educated audience’ (Jacoby, 1987, p. 5).
Drezner (2017) points out that today’s intellectuals have been facilitated by three factors:
the evaporation of public confidence in institutions, the polarisation of society, and
increasing economic inequality. The last factor is also the most important factor, according
to Drezner (2017), empowering a new kind of public intellectual. Among thought leaders,
the most effective are both experts and activists who carry particular weight in the collective
deliberations of democratic systems. This weighting system results from the continuing
stream of social interactions between citizens (Ahn, Huckfeldt, & Ryan, 2014).
Considering the role of the media, Dahlgren (2002) identifies four elements contributing
to public involvement in politics prior to the adoption of digital networks. These are: ‘media
exposure, talking about media output, opinion formation, and political participation’
(2002, p. 16). He starts with the idea that ‘media exposure is a necessary precondition for
deliberation and the power of the voice to cut through’ (Dahlgren, 2002, p. 16). His
argument acknowledges that media exposure helps create raw material that people use as
they work together in social settings to form opinions around political participation.
Dahlgren’s comment recognises the well-established agenda-setting role (Dahlgren, 2005,
2013) traditionally performed by legacy media in its capacity to amplify the power of the
individual voice (Dahlgren, 2012). Such a perspective echoes the role of personal influence
in developing people’s opinions and aligns with the 2-step flow theory of information (Katz
& Lazarsfeld, 1955). In this model, information is first judged important by opinion leaders,
and then by those they influence. Arguably, the power of the individual voice is relevant
both in micro communication exchanges, around the water cooler (Brewster, Croucher,
Wood, & Brookes, 2007; Morrison, Wheeler-Smith, & Kamdar, 2011), and in global debates
where single voices can cut through the cacophony to speak directly and authoritatively to
a nation or generation, and across divisions of age, culture, class and religious affiliation
(Castells, 2008; da Conceição-heldt & Meunier, 2014; Thunberg, 2019).
The hyperconnected networks of the digital world create opportunities for citizens to
adopt ‘information shortcuts’ for making good decisions (Somin, 2016). Among many
different types of shortcuts, publics may follow the directions of thought leaders who share
similar values but are notable for their knowledge of public policy issues. Connectivity leads
to a networked knowledge-sharing and social capital base (Lefebvre et al., 2016), helping
explain the role of knowledge champions as providing information shortcuts. Over time
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people come to trust that a specific speaker will deliver relevant, quality information, thus
assigning credibility to the power of the individual voice.

Open access to information?
The open communication of science, and the public’s access to the fruits of academic
labour more generally, have created opportunities for broadening the academy-societal
interface. Academic publication models tend to lock up intellectual content behind
paywalls that create shareholder value for publishers’ investors, instead of informing
citizens. In addition to the people who currently read academic outputs normally needing
their institution to pay a subscription fee, there is the added matter of the voluntary
labour of academic peer review systems. These review activities add value and serve as
a proxy guarantee of quality. They are usually financed as part of the relevant academic’s
government/student funded role. The journal in which you read this article, for example,
has a paywall and is funded via subscription, which may have been paid for by
a university or a particularly engaged (and most likely tenured) academic, or bundled
with an annual membership subscription to a learned association.
This model of access to the outcomes of scholarly research tends to exclude say,
fifteen-year old schoolgirls: the age that Greta Thunberg was when she started what is
now the School Strike for Climate campaign (Green, 2020). With government funding
and university students’ co-payment contributions typically financing academic labour,
and with both finance streams implying that such work should be for the public good,
equity would suggest that academic outputs should be available to all interested citizens,
regardless of age, and without a user-pays cost.
Equity similarly underpins the view that open access is a minimum starting point from
which to address the systemic disadvantage impacting the global South. The majority
world’s traditional intellectual property and productive labour have been ruthlessly
exploited by the global North over the centuries; before, during and after colonisation.
There are compelling reasons why academic work and evidence-based research should
circulate freely through global social knowledge networks, offering benefit where rele
vant. Not least of these reasons is the disproportionate impact of early manifestations of
the climate emergency upon the global South, which has contributed least to the crisis.
Even so, it is the South which is bearing the brunt of the social and political, as well as the
environmental, consequences (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2013; Rigg, 2007). Reassuringly,
there is evidence of a significant trend towards global access to knowledge.
In an article that provides an overview of the growing momentum of the open access
movement, New Scientist journalist Lawton (2018) argues that the world is poised on the
cusp of change. Noting that scientific publishing has been characterised by ‘big money,
piracy, hacking, infighting, fake news and free speech’, mirroring the journalism/social
media debates canvassed above, Lawton constructs the issue of open access as nothing
less than a battle for the ‘soul of science itself’ (Lawton, 2018). He predicts that within
10 years all publicly funded knowledge will be open for public access and able to circulate
through debate and discussion, informing an educated and engaged citizenry (Lawton,
2018). The move towards open scholarship and open science consequently helps reha
bilitate the academy-societal interface whilst also allowing knowledge champions, both
public intellectuals and thought leaders, to engage with publics around their evidence.
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The next section considers the juxtaposition of the academy and society and highlights
both the role of personal influence (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955) and that of the individual
voice in hyperconnected societies. Before doing this, it will consider the different roles
and contributions of public intellectuals, thought leaders and legacy media.

Academy-societal interface in hyperconnected societies
A straightforward, but not entirely accurate depiction of the public intellectual and the
thought leader might align the intellectual with the academy and the charismatic, but not
necessarily qualified thought leader (Drezner, 2017) with society. Although the roles can
be distinguished, they are not necessarily distinct and rely upon each other for maximum
beneficial effectiveness. Ideally, the academy connects with thought leaders who arise
from specific social contexts, but who can communicate across generations, cultures and
continents. Through engagement, the academy has continuing relevance: even at a time
of disruption via unruly speakers and publics. Indeed, effective movements for change
generally include input from both thought leaders and academics.
Margaret Mead is credited with first noting that ‘a small group of thoughtful, com
mitted citizens can change the world; indeed, it is the only thing that ever has’ (Mead, as
quoted in Applewhite, Evans, & Frothingham, 2003, p. 69). Indeed, the Western demo
cratic model, and the notion of free speech that it champions (Nunziato, 2009; Stone,
2008; Warburton, 2009) entails a dynamic engagement between a group of people, and
ideas. The capacity for an individual to motivate and be part of just such a group is
offered as evidence for the continuing power of the individual voice. Voices that cut
through, however, have to stand out from the crowd. Even before open communication
of research, hyperconnectivity connects interested publics with an effectively infinite
number of speakers, philosophies and perspectives. The links between these entities are
so diverse and numerous that an attempt to examine them can be overwhelming.
Unravelling is connectivity represents the core of the business model upon which
Google and other search engines are based (Halavais, 2017; Lewandowsk, Kerkmann,
Rümmele, & Sünkler, 2018; Vise & Malseed, 2005).
Over the past generation, information consumers (Nicholas et al., 2003) have acquired
the power to change systems and algorithms to reflect the number of people using a system
and the types of usage made. Indeed, citizens in Western democracies have become well
aware that when they pay attention to content, that in and of itself creates value. Digital
activity is tracked, recorded and monetised and people are reluctantly learning to see
themselves as organisms that produce ‘data’ (Lupton, 2018). Additionally, the contributions
people make in their role as ‘content creators’ (Green & Jenkins, 2014; Holton, Coddington,
& Gil de Zúñiga, 2013) helps inform the knowledge they gain, driving the algorithmic
determinants of others’ information feeds. The ‘likes’ and the comments (Thorson, 2014;
Winter, Brückner, & Krämer, 2015), are homogenised and commodified with the antici
pated outcome of delivering ‘eyeballs’ (Ju, Jeong, & Chyi, 2014; Mandiberg, 2012), or
‘audience share’ (Papacharissi, 2007; Sullivan, 2019), to the greater good of the media
platforms they use and the advertisers who fund it and the shareholders who reap the
dividends. Thus, even when the western democratic/free-market model of open commu
nication is working well, the market place for ideas is essentially one that is distorted by
algorithms and dynamics that foster profit and relative platform advantage.
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Such distortions are routinely subject to further complications. In addition to the
market itself, there is a range of philosophical perspectives and cultural groupings that do
not support open knowledge and seek to undermine western information networks. One
signal example of this is the Cambridge Analytica scandal that cost Facebook
a (temporary but significant) drop in share value, and a large fine (Cadwalladr &
Graham-Harrison, 2018; Isaak & Hanna, 2018; Vaidhyanathan, 2018). The scandal
revealed Facebook’s capacity for being appropriated to spruik fake news and extremist
views (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018; Isaak & Hanna, 2018), as well as its
potential to contribute to social fragmentation, and ideological polarisation (DiFranzo
& Gloria-Garcia, 2017). Following the Cambridge Analytica scandal, Vaidhyanathan
(2018) states that ‘Facebook undermines their [the institutions’] ability to support
healthy public deliberation. Facebook distorts the very sources of news and information
on which a democratic republic relies’ (p.8). Such distortions increasingly speak to
publics who embrace conspiracy theories, providing ample evidence, for those who
don’t, that the openness of communication is being disrupted by unruly speakers and
publics. Even so, stellar examples remain of the open communication of science cutting
through the maelstrom and offering proof that fact can still underpin public discussion,
countering and challenging unwarranted assertions and ill-informed speculation
(Dennis, 2018; Lee, Choi, Kim, & Kim, 2014; Meraz, 2009; Yin, 1999).

Media and the power of the individual voice
Although digital communication channels have disrupted the ‘rivers of (advertising)
gold’ (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [ACCC], 2019, p. 56; Flew &
Wilding, 2020) that used to fund quality journalism, the legacy media continues to play
a vital part in curating, gatekeeping and providing informed comment. Given that
younger generations have lost the habit of tuning into a news programme or reading
a newspaper, it is tempting to believe that such organisations no longer have relevance.
This is a misconstruction. It is not that there is no ongoing need for the professional
journalism skills that characterise legacy media output: there is. Indeed, as the ACCC
inquiry identified, the recirculating of legacy media content is a major contributor to the
‘stickiness’ of digital platforms, helping attract and retain their audiences (ACCC, 2019).
The issue is that while quality journalism remains needed and valued for its agenda
setting and validation roles (McCombs, 2018; McCombs & Shaw, 2016), it has never been
directly funded by those who need and value it. Instead it is funded by organisations
intent on delivering ‘audiences for sale to advertisers’ (Smythe, 1977, p. 16). The
challenge is to persuade consumers used to accessing quality content without a clear
cost threshold that the quality content in question is worth paying for. Essentially, the
search is on for new models to fund quality journalism while incentivising consumerpays practices. The indication is that some of the innovative strategies to achieve this
outcome are working (Albarran, 2016; Küng, 2015), partly because readers and audiences
appreciate that journalistic practice interrogates speakers on their behalf, in order to
inform selection of the individual voices that society should pay attention to. And this is
where Dahlgren’s (2002) perceived role of the media in identifying and amplifying voices
remains relevant.
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This is not to say that legacy media does not benefit from the challenges offered by the
current chaos and anarchy evident in the free market of ideas. Glasgow Media Group
(Eldridge, 2000; Philo, 2014) is one of a range of critical commentators that point to the
well-established tendency of legacy media to support ‘the establishment’. Further, on
occasion, the media put profit and shareholder value before objective truth-telling. At the
same time, reflecting the patterns inherent in the adversarial nature of the Westminster
model of deliberative democracy, and the prosecution and defence perspectives of the
courts that underpin law and order in such democracies, the media has a default setting
of enlisting speakers from the more extreme perspectives to foster public debate.
Consensus and agreement don’t make a ‘story’, and the successful identification of
a middle path is much less likely to inform a satisfying water cooler debate than open
discord. Given this, the traditional patterns of privilege accruing to the legacy media have
themselves been challenged by the digital disruptions assigned to unruly speakers and
publics: to the benefit of deliberative democracy.
It is in this context that social media, as a specific incarnation of digital media, is
identifying and highlighting voices that achieve break-through against a background of
chaos and cacophony. Social media, and the platforms that support them, help informa
tion consumers identify the sources juxtaposed to legacy media. This dynamic recognises
that digital media is increasingly the underpinning technology for legacy media, as well as
for social media. A case study from Vietnam, where the legacy media is under the control
of the government, provides valuable evidence of the channels through which social
media exerts influence on public opinion and, as a direct consequence, upon the content
carried in legacy media (Le, 2018). In order to maintain relevance, legacy media are
forced to acknowledge the voices and arguments highlighted by disruptive social media.
Legacy titles cannot pretend that they alone are the arbiters of what is worth paying
attention to when a significant proportion of citizens are engaged with and debating
alternative voices. So how is the role of the public intellectual impacted by the different
perspectives of the legacy media on the one hand and social media on the other?

Critiquing the roles of public intellectual and thought leader
The contest between media forms, between legacy media and social media, is a significant
element contributing to the formation of ‘unruly speakers and publics’. It also supports
the development of a double meaning to the term ‘public intellectual’. In traditional
media terms, this role been reserved for established intellectuals who were willing to
engage with the public through relevant and accessible discourse, and whose opinions are
valued by the legacy media that championed them. Examples might include the historian,
Mary Beard, and the physicist Brian Cox.
Mary Beard and Brian Cox, as examples, do not only have expertise in a particular
field, but also have a talent for communicating with a wide and diverse audience. Mary
Beard, Professor of Classics at the University of Cambridge, is more than one of the
world’s best-known classicists. She is also widely known for ‘her interventions in public
life [that] offer an alternative mode of discourse, one that people are hungry for:
a position that is serious and tough in argument, but friendly and humorous in manner,
and one that, at a time when disagreements quickly become shrill or abusive, insists on
dialogue’ (Higgins, 2018). Meanwhile, Brian Cox, Professor of Physics at Manchester
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University, was a pop musician with band D:Ream before focusing on a career in science.
He is known for publicising scientific thought, theory and fact to a broad audience
through popular science programmes and accessible publishing that targets lay readers
such as (Cox & Forshaw, 2009) Why Does E = mc2? (And Why Should We Care?).
In digital contexts, however, a new generation of social media users has refined the
definition of ‘public intellectual’ to identify certain individuals whose work is valued by
sufficient numbers, groups and cross-sections of the connected global audience to be elevated
to public prominence. This perspective aligns with the shift in focus from a traditional
emphasis upon the intellectual element of the public intellectual as validated by the impri
matur of the academy, to the conception of public intellectual that foregrounds the power of
the public to claim and celebrate its own intellectuals. This dynamic, in effect, highlights the
fact that being an intellectual is only one of the ways in which a person can be identified as
having a powerful individual voice capable of functioning as the promoter of reason and as
a wellspring of ideas that nurture political debate and active citizenship. It emphasises the
public element of the public intellectual: the intellectual component is assigned importance
because the public has decided that the content speaks to them in a direct way.
Accepting the possible contestation around whether the emphasis is placed on ‘public’ or
on ‘intellectual’, Dahlgren (2012) nonetheless locates public intellectuals as embedded in
‘the structural setting of mediated public spheres with a particular emphasis on the online
sector’ (2012, p. 95). It is the many-to-many communication enabled by hyperconnectivity
that is constructed as disrupting the orderly advance of political ideas. While it is eminently
arguable as to whether such order ever truly existed, even in the pre-internet era, Dahlgren’s
hope for the public intellectual is that their voice and input will motivate an engaged
citizenry ‘towards the ideal of a talking public’ (2002, p. 9).
While a talking public is a defining characteristic of deliberative democracy, the full
realisation of effective government as an operational ideal assumes that the talk engaged
in by the relevant public should be based on informed comment and opinion rather than
fake news (Farkas & Schou, 2019; McKay & Tenove, 2020), flaky politics, unruly speakers
and fractured publics. It is in these circumstances that the reputable, but legacy media
institutions of western democracies may operate as honest brokers (Edwards, 2001;
Livingstone & Lunt, 1994) in identifying fact from fiction (Schwalbe, Silcock, &
Candello, 2015); elevating some opinions while casting doubt (or scorn) upon others
(Munson & Resnick, 2010; Schnell, 2001). While younger social media-infused publics
may find this role problematic, in that it can seem stuffy, elitist and even somewhat antidemocratic (Fuchs, 2013; McChesney, 2016), the circulation of legacy media-curated
comment on and by social media (Newman, 2011; Tsagkias, De Rijke, & Weerkamp,
2011) means that such legacy institutions continue to have relevance across generations
and without regard to platform. Accordingly, younger citizens may tacitly accept that
public intellectuals have a role to play while simultaneously resisting the sense of an
entitlement to speak conferred upon them by the legacy media.
But can a non-intellectual really be termed a public intellectual? And, if not, what role
does such an individual play? Drezner (2017) argues against an ideal whereby democratic
engagement is positioned as the particular purview of the public intellectual. He suggests
that the ‘traditional public intellectual’ is more ‘ready to explain why some new policy
idea is unlikely to work’ (2017, p. 101) than they are to promote a positive vision for the
future. This conception of the public intellectual is one that operates in critique, a voice
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that teases out possibilities and consequences, likely fact and probable fiction, from the
suggestions that circulate in the political domain. Drezner (2017) identifies a need for
a more proactive role then ‘critic’. He assigns that role to a group of people whom he
terms ‘thought leaders’. Drezner’s view is that these citizens should have a ‘positive idea
for change and the conviction that they can make a difference’ (p. 101). This positioning
of the thought leader returns the paper to Margaret Mead’s ‘small group of thoughtful,
committed citizens [who] can change the world’. Ultimately, to be a member of Mead’s
group, someone needs to have a belief in their capacity to make a difference and the
confidence that they know the difference to be made. Drezner (2017) recognises a role for
both elements of the public intellectual/thought leader duo whereby thought leaders
produce new ideas that have the capacity to excite and energise others as to the potential
for change, and public intellectuals analyse and critique those ideas.
Greta Thunberg, in her much-repeated injunction ‘listen to the scientists’ (Milman &
Smith, 2019) provides an example of a thought leader who champions knowledge. Her
acknowledgement that she knows that something is wrong, and knows whom she trusts to
have the best path forward in addressing that wrong, establishes her as a thought leader who is
pointing her generation to respect the work of experts in the relevant fields. But Thunberg is
more than a touchstone for a generation. Thunberg harnesses a range of publics who seek to
pressure government (and industry, and the financial markets) to develop policies to respect
core, informed, evidence-based knowledge as the underpinning impetus for public action and
decision-making. She does this through using the power of her individual voice to link with
and influence generations beyond her own. One of Thunberg’s strategies for achieving this
goal is in communicating with established public intellectuals that already have cut-through
voices in their own right, with their own key publics. David Attenborough and Jane Goodall
are appropriate examples of such people, but Thunberg also aligns herself as being against the
‘enemies’ of her cause, showing herself to be more than a match for an intellectual contest
with past President of the United States, Donald Trump. Thunberg’s thought leadership
aligns her with key public intellectuals, and against enemies of knowledge, while her words
communicate authoritatively across generations, cultures and contexts.
Thunberg is offered as a shining exemplar of the continuing power of the individual
voice communicating across time and space regardless of the disruption caused by unruly
speakers and publics. Too young to vote at an age where she galvanised millions around the
globe, few thought leaders in history have achieved the impact Thunberg enabled through
the power of hyperconnected media. She sparks the imaginations of those who champion
the role of knowledge in helping the world work through a series of existence-limiting
challenges. The contribution made by Thunberg and her audiences continues to inform
political processes in the world’s deliberative democracies (Devaney et al., 2020). With luck,
the impact of Thunberg’s ideas will mean that her generation is not the last one to
repurpose old terms for new circumstances.

Conclusion
This paper has suggested the importance both of public intellectuals and thought
leaders in illuminating the role played by the individual voice in providing continuity
at a time when the open communication of research is disrupted by unruly speakers
and publics.
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The synthesis of these two roles allows for the refinement of possibilities and the
nuanced development of ways forward that strengthen the operation of deliberative
democracies. Such a dynamic helps identify key priorities while making the actions of
an engaged citizenry more relevant and effective. This complementarity of thought
leaders with public intellectuals potentially serves as the yin and yang of what might be
termed the role of knowledge championship. Together and separately the thought leader
and public intellectual produce and promote knowledge, but in different ways, using
complementary and mutually beneficial starting points. In effect knowledge champions,
as represented in the work of thought leaders and public intellectuals, provide examples
of continuity around the power of the individual voice to make a difference to the
societies in which they live. They do this work in defiance of disruption by unruly publics
and speakers. Arguably open science, and society-wide access to the fruits of knowledge,
support the rise of knowledge championship in promoting an alignment between the
direction in which society is moving and the one that science has identified as being
beneficial.
The ‘small group of thoughtful, committed citizens’ championed by Mead do
offer a vision of continuity over time, proving the power of the individual voice and
vision to change the world, one argument at a time, society by society in
a hyperconnected globe. As a dynamic underpinning, Dahlgren (2002, 2009)
advances a model for a civic cultures framework. This second model has six over
lapping, inter-related dimensions: identities; knowledge; practices; spaces; trust, and
values (paraphrasing and essentialising Dahlgren, 2009, p. 123). These dimensions
are arranged here in alphabetical order, which puts the element ‘identities’ first,
which has the added benefit of reflecting Dahlgren’s positioning of that aspect of
civic engagement as being the most important one. Dahlgren conceptualises iden
tities as interacting with knowledge, practices, spaces, trust and values to create the
framework within which ideas circulate through and across societies.
One possible reason why identities are elevated in Dahlgren’s framework is that they
are developed and informed in interaction with the ideas circulated through culture by
the dual agency of public intellectuals and thought leaders. Socially engaged knowledge
champions potentially motivate individual engagement with complex arguments,
prompting the discussion of ideas within and between social and political networks.
This work of the knowledge champion becomes especially crucial in an era of fake news,
flaky politics, unruly speakers and fractured publics. That’s because the knowledge
champion’s lone voice gives an opportunity for people to cut through the clutter and
see clearly what it is that needs to be discussed; what it is that needs to be prioritised, what
it is that needs to be considered at a time of change. Further, the open communication of
science improves the possibility that the discussion will proceed in an evidence-based
direction.
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